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ABSTRACT 
The Myth of the Hoovercrats: Alienation, Mobilization, and the New 
Deal Realignment in Texas. (May 1987) 
Donald Scott Barton, B. A. , Marshall University 
Chairman of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dale Baum 
The 1928 election was the first presidential election in which 
Texas cast its electoral college votes for a Republican. Herbert Hoover's 
victory has been viewed as an aberration in Texas politics, and the 
election is thought to have had little impact on subsequent elections. A 
block of Democratic voters, the Hoovercrats, switched to the Republican 
party in 1928 because of the Democratic party's nomination of a wet 
Irish Catholic from New York and returned to the Democratic party in 
1932. 
The rigorous and systematic use of quantitative methods 
demonstrates that Hoovercrats were not a viable electoral force in Texas 
politics and that the 1928 election was the first stage in the forging of 
the New Deal coalition in Texas. The combined use of quantitative 
methods and traditional historical techniques shows that Hoover's 
personal appeal resulted in the mobilization of non-voters and new 
voters. While the nomination of Alfred E. Smith by the Democrats 
resulted in massive alienation of the party's previous supporters. Most of 
Hoover's 1928 supporters moved into the Democratic column in 1932 and 
remained there in 1936. 
remained there in 1986, 
The quantitative evidence demonstrates that the most likely 
groups to drop out of the electorate because of the nomination of Smith 
were Baptists and rural farm residents. They were replaced in the party 
by non-church members, Methodists, rural non-farm residents, and urban 
dwellers. Thus, the 1928 election was the first stage in the forging of a 
new and viable coalition of voters in Texas. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the 1928 presidential election Democrats had reason 
to be confident of victory in Texas. The Lone Star state was one of two 
states that in presidential elections had never been in the Republican 
column. ' But Herbert Hoover, the Republican candidate, polled more 
votes in Texas than the previous four Republican candidates combined 
and defeated the Democratic candidate, Alfred Smith, who attracted 
100, 000 fewer votes than his party's standard-bearer in 1924. s Hoover's 
stunning victory in Texas, along with Republican victories in Florida, 
Virginia, and North Carolina, broke the "solid South. " 
Many historians and political scientists have labeled Smith's 1928 
defeat as a "critical election. " V. O. Key, a noted political scientist, first 
coined this descriptive label in his ground-breaking and seminal article 
published in 1955. Pointing to 1928 as a critical election in New 
England, Key defined a critical election as one in which "the depth and 
intensity of electoral involvement are high, . . . more or less profound 
readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and 
in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed. "s In the wake 
This document follows the style of The Journal of American History 
Norman D. Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug: Texas 
Politics, 1921-1928 ICOSI 8e SEaa 
Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932 (Stanford, 
1947), 46, 330. 
V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections, " Journal of Politics, 17 
(Febuary 1955), 4. 
of Key's initial formulation of critical elections, political scientists and 
historians have modified the concept of realignment. Instead of just one 
critical election they postulated a critical period of two or more elections 
that disrupts the stable political environment and creates a new party 
system. In addition to critical elections there are also maintaining and 
deviating elections. Maintaining elections refer to elections in which the 
majority party maintains its power, while deviating elections refer to 
short-term forces which are great enough to cause the temporary defeat 
of the majority party. 4 
The critical election and party system perspective has divided the 
American political past into distinct electoral eras. The first party 
system or "pre-party" system lasted from 1789 to 1827. Andrew 
Jackson's election in 1828 prefaced the rise of the first truly national 
parties, the Democrats and the Whigs, and the formation of the second 
party system. The third party system or the Civil War party system 
was in place by 1860, resulting from the sectional tensions between 
North and South over the issue of slavery. Abraham Lincoln's election 
brought the first sectional party, the Republicans, to power. The 
Populist protest of the 1890s and dissatisfaction with the Democratic 
party in the urban Northeast resulted in the fourth party system. The 
fifth party system was the New Deal party system forged by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's election in 1932. The breakdown of the fifth party system 
and the creation of the sixth party system is a topic of debate among 
4 Angus Campbell, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, 
The American Voter (New York, 1960), 521-38. 
scholars. s In critical election theory an electoral era begins with a 
dramatic voter realignment which consists of a period of stability and 
ends with another realignment which culminates a period of electoral 
instability. During the stable phase of a party system, very little party 
switching occurs. The stable electoral period is followed by fiuctuations 
in voting patterns. Realignment perspective was initially formulated 
with only active voters in mind, persons disfranchised, disinterested. or 
not yet eligible were conceptually excluded. Fluctuations in voting 
patterns could only be explained by partisan switching of voters. 
Recently, scholars have examined the effects caused by mobilization of 
new voters and previous non-voters, opening up a valuable new window 
on our view of the electorate. 
Since a critical election or critical period ends with a decay phase 
and stability is restored, some students of realignment theory point to 
realignment as a surrogate for revolution. This has led some historians 
and political scientists to examine the policy consequences of 
realignment. 7 
Key concluded that before the "Roosevelt revolution" at the polls 
in 1932, there was a "Smith revolution" in 1928. Samuel Lubell agreed 
Dale Baum, The Civil War Party System: The Case of Massachusetts, 
1848-1877 ( ape, , -; erome . u, sam 
Flan ga, and Nan y H. Z gal, Fa ldaa Haaggtnna t: Vat 
Parties, and Government in American m ry ever y iIIsS98III, 
r ean u am, n sc e sons and the Mainsprings 
of American Politics (New York, 
Krisit Anderson, The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936 
(Chicago, 1979), -, -; aum, e ivy ar aKy 
~trays em, 18-19. 
Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, Partisan Realignment, 19-20. 
with Key's assessment, but he claimed the Smith revolution went beyond 
just New England to include a "revolt of the cities, " essentially in the 
industrial Northeast, which had previously been a Republican stronghold. 
Jerome Clubb and Howard Allen challenged the "revolt of the cities" 
concept by moving beyond just presidential politics and examining minor 
elections, including congressional and gubernatorial elections. While 
Smith carried the cities in 1928, the Republicans maintained their 
strength in the key industrial cities at the bottom of the ballot. From 
this they concluded that although 1928 was part of a critical period, it 
was not a critical election. 
Some historians have gone beyond labelling elections and have 
examined the process of realignment. James Sundquist declares that the 
New Deal coalition was forged by the votes of previous Republicans who 
switched allegiance in 1932 while Kristi Anderson argues that 
mobilization of new voters or previous non-voters was crucial to the 
creation of a Democratic majority. s 
The Democratic party increased its popularity, according to some 
historians, because Smith appealed to the immigrants. The Democi'atic 
party, despite the loss of the Southern states in the 1928 election, was 
stronger because recent immigrant voters became firmly entrenched in 
Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections, " 4-5, 11-12; Samuel Lubell, The 
Future of American Politics (New York, 1965), 48-52; Jerome RE 
u an owar . en, "The Cities and the Election of 1928: 
Partisan Realignment?" American Historical Review 74 (April 1969), 
1218-19. 
Anderson, The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 30-31, 64-66; 
James L. Sun qui, ynamics o e ar o o ical Parties in the 
United States (Washin n. . . - . as n n, T9~4:IP. 
the Democratic column with the nomination of a "wet" Irish Catholic. 
This interpretation implies that the Democrats, even without the 
Depression, might have been able to defeat the Republicans in 1932 by 
nominating a Protestant candidate bringing the solid South back into the 
Democratic camp. Ruth Silva's quantitative analysis of the 1928 election 
concludes that foreign-stock heritage was the best single predictor of the 
Smith vote. Anderson's mobilization theory for the New Deal 
realignment also supports the interpretation that Smith, despite his 
defeat, had a positive influence on the Democratic party, since he 
mobilized previously uninvolved groups such as immigrants, women, 
young people, and the urban working class. 
Some students of critical election theory reject 1928 as a crucial 
element in the creation of the New Deal party system. They point out 
that realignment is part of the response to a crisis, and the crisis which 
created the New Deal party system was the Great Depression. Winning 
the immigrant vote in 1928 did not trigger the transition from the fourth 
to the fifth party system. 
Realignment theory has recently come under attack as a method 
for studying political history. Allan Lichtman argues that the 
realignment perspective impedes the understanding of American political 
history because it has become too concerned with classifying elections; 
David Burner, The Politics of Provincilism: The Democratic Party in 
Transistion, 1 - ew or, , -; u . i va, 
Ram, 1696o, OVotes: 1926 Re-e am' 6 (U ' e sity 9 2, 
1962~6249Itndasom o a e oc a tc mority, 64-66. 
Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 214-19; Clubb, Flanigan, 
and Zingale, a isan e ignmen, 
thus, the historiographical debate centers on which elections are or are 
not "critical. " Yet, it is possible to apply typologies used to label 
elections to party outcomes. For example, the Democratic party of Texas 
could have undergone a realignment in 1928 and 1932 while the same 
two elections were merely deviating elections for the Republican party. 
Using critical election theory in this way, the process of change is 
classified, not the election. 
Most historians agree that Smith and the Democrats had little 
chance for victory in 1928. Still, the election continues to be of interest 
because of the debate on the substance of the New Deal realignment and 
also because Smith was the first Catholic to run for president. Students 
of the contest point to many reasons for Smith's defeat. Most claim that 
the prosperity of the twenties made Hoover and the Republican party 
unbeatable in 1928. The Republicans capitalized on seven years of 
prosperity in the 1928 campaign. is 
William Leuchtenberg, however, believes that Smith's loss of 
normally Democratic regions of the country went beyond any single 
economic issue. Smith grew up on the sidewalks of New York City and 
was the son of an Irish immigrant. He was the first national urban 
leader to vie for the nation's highest office, and the struggle over his 
Allan J. Lichtman, "The End of Realignment Theory? Toward a 
New Research Program for American Political History, " Historical 
Methods, 15 (Fall 1982), 170; Lichtman, Prejudice andre OIV 
Peace: Tfc P e 'Ee clal Efecaoa f 1828 1 ape 
ips ive y, e r o o i ical Research: A Primer (Englewood Cliffs, 197 
Richard Hofstadter, "Could a Protestant Have Beaten Hoover in 
1928, " The Reporter, (March 17, 1960), 42-43. 
nomination by the Democratic party reflected the divisions between rural 
and urban America. Smith was a symbol of attitudes and beliefs that 
were foreign to rural Americans, while on the other hand, Hoover was 
perceived to be the personification of rural America. This interpretation 
goes very well with the Smith revolution theory since Smith won the 
cities and America continued on the road to becoming more urban after 
1928. i4 
Isolating the most salient reasons why Smith lost is a difficult 
task, but some historians have attempted to put the various aspects of 
the election into perspective. They have stressed that Smith's 
nomination drew many immigrants into the Democratic party, and 
Hoover's strength was attributable to old-stock Americans identifying 
with the Republican paxty. 
In addition to their fear of foreign-born citizens, many voters were 
allegedly dismayed by Smith's stand on the prohibition issue. This issue 
drew Protestant ministers into the political arena. Bishop James Cannon 
of the Methodist church stumped the nation, preaching against "Alcohol 
Al Smith" and the Democratic party. 
Smith's Catholic faith has often been pointed to as a msjor factor 
in his defeat. A strong anti-Catholic sentiment in the South was one of 
i4 William E. Leuchtenberg, The Perils of Pros erity, 1914-1932 
(Chicago, 1958), 237-38. 
Burner, The Politics of Provincialism, 217-18, 242-43; Lubell, The 
Future o merican o ics, -; iiva, Rum, Religion, and Vo&s, 
Burner, The Politics of Provincialism, 201; Leuchtenberg, The Perils 
of Prosperi y, 
the major reasons for the breaking of the solid South. Lichtman's 
sophisticated analysis also points to religion as the major factor in 
Smith's loss to Hoover in northern states. He argues "that regardless of 
ethnic background, prohibtion status, or economic status; Catholics and 
Protestants split more decisevely in 1928 than in any other year. " Thus, 
the 1928 election was not a critical election; instead, it was an aberrant 
election. The New Deal realignment was the result of the reaction of the 
American electorate to the responses of Hoover and Roosevelt to the 
Depression. 
Almost all studies of the New Deal realignment have focused on 
northern states. Key's article is on New England; and Lubell, Clubb and 
Allen also focus on northern cities. Although Sundquist examines 
primarily northern states, he includes a discussion of the aftershocks of 
the New Deal realignment in the South after the 1948 election. 
Anderson's study is based on a survey of Chicago voters. Lichtman 
analyzes exclusevely northern states. Burner's study, however, mentions 
anti-Catholic sentiment in the South. But Burner does not 
systematically examine Southern voting patterns nor assesses the impact 
of religion on the election results in the South. 
The South has thus been relatively ignored in the study of 
electoral changes in the first half of the twentieth century. Examination 
of turnout has led some students of electoral behavior to conclude that 
the "New Deal party system of which the Solid Democratic South was a 
crucial part, ironically witnessed no fundamental modification in 
Burner, The Politics of Provincialism, 242-43; Lichtman, Prejudice 
and the oi cs, 
southern voting patterns. " 
The 1928 election in Texas has received very little attention, and 
few scholars have analyzed it in the context of realignment theory. 
Key's discussion of the 1928 bolters suggested that race played a major 
role in explaining Smith's support: of the forty-five counties with a black 
population larger than twenty-five percent, Smith won forty. Religious 
bigotry, prohibition, and Smith's urban immigrant background, were 
other reasons which caused the Democrats to lose Texas. Hoover, on the 
other hand, represented traditional Southern values; he was a dry 
Protestant, from a rural background. s 
Just as in studies of national politics, students of the 1928 election 
in Texas have focused their attention on the impact of religion and 
prohibition as the major issues of the campaign. A study of the activities 
of political preachers demonstrates that the greatest shifts in Democratic 
support came in Tarrant, Dallas, Taylor, and Lubbock counties, which 
were regions of intense activity by political preachers. One post-election 
anaylsis declared that religion was not as important an issue as 
prohibition while historian Seth Shepard McKay called the election, "just 
another prohibition contest. " 
Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Politics and the 
Second Reconstruction (Baltimore, 1976), 12- 
Key with Alexander Heard, Southern Politics in State and Nation 
(New York, 1950), 320-21. 
Seth Shepard McKay, Texas Politics, 1906-1944: With Special 
ryan rey, o i ica arsons: exas Churchmen and the Election 
Dam~homas, "The Campaign of 1928, " Southwest Review 14 (January 1929), 224. 
10 
Traditional accounts of Texas politics in the 1928 election and the 
New Deal period have concentrated on the activities of political elites. 
The most recent study, for example, examines the intricacies of 
intraparty factionalism in Texas during the 1928 campaign and argues 
that this factionalism determined the outcome in Texas. Two other 
works on Texas politics focus on the intraparty affairs of the Republican 
party. Both concentrate on the battle for supremacy in the Texas 
Republican party between R. B. Creager, state Republican party 
chairman, and Congressman Harry Wurzback. 
This study will probably confirm many of the traditional accounts 
of the 1928 election, but it will also challenge some accepted 
interpretations about the contest and its effects on Texas politics, 
Obviously, prohibition and anti-Catholicism were two important factors 
in explaining Smith's defeat in Texas. The extent to which these two 
moralistic issues affected the outcome needs to be explored. Moreover, 
since V. O. Key's work on the 1928 Texas bolters, there has not been a 
systematic study of racism and the 1928 election. Race is an essential 
element when examining any twentieth century election in the South. 
The "lily-white" Republican movement and Smith's liberal stance on race 
could have significantly affected the outcome of the 1928 contest. 
The concept of Texas "Hoovercrats" needs to be subjected to close 
scrutiny. A movement by prominent Texans in 1928 to bring Texas 
Democrats into the Hoover camp, while maintaining their allegiance to 
Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 374; Paul D. Casdorph, 
A History o~e~pu ican a y m exas, 1865-1965 (Austin, 
ger . en, rom o en Triump~he Texas 
Republicans Since 1920 (Dallas, 
the rest of the Democratic ticket, could have been totally unsuccessful. 
Hoover could have received most of his support from previous non-voters 
thus making the Hoovercrats of very little importance. 
Traditional approaches to the 1928 election in Texas have 
answered many questions, but many questions remain unanswered. For 
example, it is well-documented that turnout in Texas increased by over 
50, 000 from 1924 to 1928. Political scientists and historians have 
assumed that the increase in turnout in Texas and the South reflected 
the national trend although on a much smaller scale, Turnout in Texas 
increased by only seven and one-half percent while nationally the 
increase was nearly twenty-one percent. Yet little, if any attention, 
has been given to the task of uncovering the partisan preferences of the 
new voters. Another unanswered question is how prevelant was party 
switching in 1928. Recently, realignment studies have focused attention 
on the debate between mobilization and conversion of voters as causes of 
the New Deal realignment. 
Despite statements by some political historians who claim 
Southern voting patterns remained unchanged throughout the New Deal 
era, it remains theoretically possible that the Lone Star state' s 
Democratic party underwent a two-stage realignment. Voters who 
dropped out of the electorate in 1928 could have been replaced by 
previous non-voters mobilized not only by Roosevelt in 1932 but also by 
Hoover in 1928. Ironically, anti-Smith sentiment in Texas may have 
pulled some previous non-voters into the electorate for the first time in 
Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 330. 
12 
1928. These possibilities need to be investigated. One thing, however, is 
clear: the realignment in Texas did not lead to the creation of a 
competitive two-party system. Instead, the Democratic party underwent 
changes in its make-up between 1924 and 1932. Thus, an extremely 
important task is to identify the voters, in ethnic, religious, and economic 
terms, who dropped in or out of the active electorate during these years. 
Democratic voters after the 1928 election may have been less concerned 
about moral issues, like prohibition, and more concerned about dealing 
with the effects of the Depression. 
13 
CHAPTER II 
DEMOCRATS, HOOVERCRATS, REPUBLICANS AND NON-VOTERS 
Questions raised about past Texas politics in the previous chapter 
are not intractable to quanititative solutions. J. Morgan Kousser 
advocates that historians make creative use of contingency tables 
containing voter transistion probabilities between any two election pairs. 
While several other methods are available for estimating the voting 
behavior of individuals from one election to the next, Kousser has proven 
that ecological regression estimation is the most useful and accurate 
method. t 
Ecological regression originally was developed by statisticians and 
employed by sociologists concerned about overcoming the so-called 
"ecological fallacy. " W. S. Robinson dramatically announced in 1950 that 
individual behavior cannot automatically be assumed from correlations 
derived from ecological or geographical data. Since Robinson's 
admonishment there have been many attempts to circumvent the 
problem of making unbiased assumptions about the behavior of 
individuals when all the researcher has to work with are aggregated 
data 
Although political historians continually confront the problem of 
drawing conclusions from county election returns and comparable census 
J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past 
I olitics, " Journal of Interdisci linary History, 4 (Autumn 1973), 237, 
261-62. 
W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of 
Individuals, " American Sociolo 'cal Review, 15 (June 1950), 357. 
14 
data, it was a sociologist who first proposed using ecological regression, 
rather than correlations, to infer descriptive properties of groups from 
aggregate data. Leo Goodman's ecological regression method was 
subsequently improved W. Phillips Shively, a political scientist, who 
demonstrated that although Goodman's technique could within certain 
limits be refined to draw unbiased conclusions about individual behavior, 
regression methods result in estimates that cannot be verified unless 
comparable individual data are available. Nevertheless, the use of 
ecological regression as refined by Goodman, Shively, and Kousser is a 
powerful statistical tool which can be used for discovering relationships 
between various characteristics of voting units postulated to explain 
variations in the vote. Other methods, like simple regression coefficients, 
Pearson correlation coeffiecients, factor analysis, and homogeneous unit 
analysis that can only be used to generalize intuitively about the voting- 
unit being analyzed. s 
Regression methods enable the students of political history to 
examine all possible combinations or patterns of voting behavior between 
any two elections. The potential Texas electorate in a pair of successive 
elections in the 1920s and 1930s can be divided into eight mutually 
exclusive categories: (1) voting for the same party in both elections; (2) 
switching parties; (3) casting ballots in the first election, but not in the 
Leo A. Goodman, "Ecological Regression and the Behavior of 
Individuals, " American Sociological Review, 18 (May 1953), 663-64; 
W. Phillips ive y, co ogic n erence: The Use of Aggregate 
Data to Study Individuals, " American Political Science Review, 63 
(December 1969), 1194; William, amgan an ancy . ingale, 
"Alchemists Gold: Inferring Individual Relationships From Aggregate 
Data, " Social Science History, 9 (Winter 1985), 88-89; Kousser, 
"Ecologic gression an e nalysis of Past Politics, " 239, 244-47. 
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second election (even though the poll tax was paid); (4) voting in the first 
election and ineligible in the second because of nonpayment of poll tax; 
(5) not voting in the first election (even though the poH tax was paid) 
and voting in the second; (6) not initially paying the poll tax, thus, not 
voting in the first election and subsequently voting in the second election; 
(7) paying the poll tax and not voting in both elections; and finally, (8) 
not paying the poll tax and thus being inelibible to vote in both elections. 
Analyzing the size of these groups in pairs of elecitons makes it possible 
to explain changes in voting alignments and preferences of aH possible 
voters from one election to the next. By examining a series of elections 
over a period of time, one can detect subtle changes in the movement of 
voters into and out of the active electorate and uncover changes in party 
loyalty. 4 
This study will use two types of non-voters. namely, those paying 
poH taxes but not voting, and those not paying the poH tax (and thus 
being ineligible to vote). In examining Texas electoral changes, the two 
non-voting groups will be treated not unlike political parties, for not- 
voting is a political choice that can have tremendous effect on electoral 
results. While other political historians have utilized non-voters to study 
political realignment, this study will have the advantage of using two 
types of non-voters. The poll tax gives the political historian a new 
window into the electorate. It not only can yield information about 
disfranchisement but also about mobilization and alienation of voting 
blocks. 
4 Baum, The Civil War Party System, 18-19. 
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In addition to examining changes in turnout and partisan loyalties 
over the period 1924-1936, an array of background or explanatory 
variables describes in a statistical sense the social and economic factors 
that shaped a particular electoral result. A complete list of variables 
used is contained in Table 1. 
It may be recalled that in securing the 1928 nomination, Alfred E, 
Smith split the Democratic forces of Texas. Thomas B. Love, a leading 
prohibitionist from the Woodrow Wilson era who led the "ultra-drys", 
opposed Smith because of the New York governor's stand on prohibition. 
A group of young upstart liberal Democrats, including Charles Francis of 
Wichita Falls, Connie Renfro of Dallas, Allen Peden of Houston, and 
Frank Culver, Jr. of Fort Worth, challenged the "drys, " hoping to use 
the Smith campaign to destroy what they termed as the "Love-Sells- 
Hicks" hegemony over the Texas Democratic party. s 
Bitter political opponents set aside their differences to achieve the 
common purpose of defeating the New York governor. Love joined forces 
with former Texas governor Oscar B. Colquitt, a recent dry convert who 
had previously opposed national prohibition. The split in the party 
between pro and anti-Smith supporters was fully evident in 1927 when 
William Gibbs McAdoo dropped out of the race for the Democratic 
nomination. Love had been the leading McAdoo supporter in the state. 
Conversely, former political allies became opponents over their position 
on Smith, who was easily the frontrunner after McAdoo's decision to drop 
out of the race. Albert Sidney Burleson, Postmaster General in the 
Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 374-77. 
Table 1. DEFINITION 
VARIABLE NAME DEFINITION 
PDEM24 
PRE P24 
POTH24 
PPPT24 
PNPT24 
PDEM'2S 
PREP28 
POTHSS 
PPPT28 
PN PT28 
PDEM32 
PREP32 
POTH32 
PPPT82 
PNPT82 
PDEM86 
candidate, in 1986 
PRE P86 
in 19S6 
POT H36 
PPPT36 
PNPTSS 
PBAPT 
PMETH 
PCATH 
PNOREL 
PBLREO 
POTHR 
PRURF 
PRURNF 
PURB 
PRIS 
PFOWHT 
PNAWHT 
PBLACK 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent voting for Alfred M. Landon, the Republican candidate, 
Percent voting for third party candidates in 1936 
Percent not voting despite paying the poll tax in 19SS 
Percent not paying the poll tax In 1936 
Percentage of Baptists in Texas 
Percentage of Methodists in Texas 
Percentage of Catholics in Texas 
Percentage of nonmhurch members in Texas 
Percentage of Black church members ln Texas 
Percentage of other religious denominations in Texas 
Percent Rural farm residents 
Percont Rural non-farm residents 
Pereeat Urban reek!ants 
Percent Hispanic population 
Percent foreign born white population 
Percent native born white population 
Percent black population 
voting for John W. Davis, the Democratic candidate, in the 1924 presidential electkm 
voting for Calvin Coolidge, the Republican candidate, in the 1924 presidential election 
voting for Robert M. La Pollette, the Progressive candidate. in 1924 
not voting despite paying the poll tax iu 1924 
not paying the poll tax in 1924 
voting for Alfred E. Sndth, the Democratic candidate, in 1928 
voting for Herbert C Hoover, the Republican candidate, in 1928 
voting for thhd patty candidates in 1928 
not voting despite paying the pos tsx in 1926 
not paying the poll tax in 1928 
voting for Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic candidate, in 1982 
voting for Herbert C. Hoover, the Repablicen candidate, in 1936 
voting for third party candidates in 1932 
not voting despite paying the poll tex in 1832 
not paying the poll tax in 1932 
voting for Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Demorratk 
Wilson administration, and Thomas Watt Gregory, United States 
Attornery General under Wilson, came out in support of Smith. But 
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Love, another leading Wilsonian Democrat in Texas, favored any dry 
candidate and was determined to oppose Smith no matter what the 
cost. s 
Although Smith and Hoover appeared poles, they represented 
many of the same ideals. Hoover has long been seen as an exponent of 
rugged individualism and a champion of big business. Smith also 
exemplified the self-made man, having worked his way to the pinnacle of 
New York politics, and in 1928, to the top of the Democratic party. Like 
Hoover, Smith espoused a firm belief in the American free enterprise 
system. The Democrats even emulated the Republican party by choosing 
a businessman, John Jacob Raskob, to manage Smith's campaign. More 
attention has been paid to Raskob's Catholicism than to his position as 
the head of General Motors. 7 
Historians have long talked about the "Smith revolution" in 1928, 
but in Texas it may be possible to posit that there was instead a "Smith 
revulsion. " The traditionally Democratic Lone Star state gave its 
electoral votes to a Republican presidential candidate for the first time in 
the state's electoral history. Hoover garnered 27, 162 more votes than 
Smith. Historians have commonly assumed that Hoover's margin of 
victory resulted from large numbers of traditional Democratic voters 
switching temporarily to the Republicans because of dissatisfaction with 
Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 374-77; Lewis L. Gould, 
Progressives a~n. ~ro i i ionis s: exas emocrats in the Wilson Era 
us lii, a as ormng ews, p em er 
September 23, 1927. 
Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance: Hoover, the Nation, 
e d the Dep eeeto o, , ; tc ~ec, retodtticcc e~ Ke 
oi ics, 
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their party's nomination of a wet Irish Catholic from New York. Thus, 
Hoovercrats voted for Hoover on their presidential ballots while still 
voting Democratic in the other contests. Most of the supporters of the 
1924 Democratic candidate, John W. Davis, sat out the 1928 election. 
Estimates derived from actual Texas county level voting statistics show 
that an insignificant number of 1924 Democratic supporters switched to 
the Republican party in 1928 (see Table 2). The over-emphasis on 
"Hoovercrats" or Republican crossover voting in Texas is probably 
attributable to merely "eyeballing" the statewide returns for the 1928 
election. The Democrats lost over 140, 000 votes from their 1924 total, 
and it is deductively easy to assume that these votes went into Hoover's 
column. But this notion assumes that turnout affected both parties 
equally. Historians thus have assumed that the Democrats lost voters to 
the Republican party in the presidential election. 
If most of Hoover's support did not come from 1924 Democratic 
voters, then most of his votes came from previous non-voters and new 
voters. The Hoover vote can be broken down into its various 
components: 1924 Republican supporters, people who paid the poll tax 
and did not vote in 1924, people who did not pay the poll tax in 1924, 
and people not yet eligible to vote in 1924. About forty-two percent of 
Hoover's support came from persons who had paid the poll tax in 1924, 
but had not voted, while another seventeen percent came from people not 
V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections, " 4-6. Journal of Politics, 
17 (Febuary 1955), 4-6, 11-12; I ubell, The Fu ure o merican 
Politics, 48-52; Robinson, The Presidentia o 
~e H e c te, " Outlot e, oveV~V, 1928), 
1243-44; Brown, Ho, onne, an i e rown Jug, 410-11. 
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yet eligible to vote in 1924. Nearly all of the 1924 Calvin Coolidge 
supporters turned out for the Republican party. Hoover received thirty- 
three percent of his vote from people who repeated their Republican 
ballots from 1924. Hoover clearly was tapping into a new source of 
voters in the 1928 contest, as nearly sixty percent of his vote total came 
from persons who had not voted in 1924 (see Table 2). 
Table 2. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING 
PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1928 ELECTIONS (in percentage of 
the electorate) (N = 254). 
PREP24 PDEM24 POTH24 PPPT24 PNPT24 PNYE24 PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP28 
DEM28 
OTH28 
PPPT28 
PNPT28 
percentage 
electcrate 
0 
6 
0 
8 
6 
18 
15 
22 
2 
0 
2 
80 
44 
68 
Note: The percentage in this and the following contingency tables were 
computed with official election returns for the entire state as reported by 
counties. The number of eligible voters was estimated by using the adult 
populations of 1920 and 1930 and extrapolating the growth in each 
county's population. The figures within the cells of the first row of table 
1 are the result of a multiple regression with the 1928 Hoover, 
percentage (Hoover) as dependent and Coolidge, Davis, La Follette, Poll 
Tax Paid Not Voting 24, Poll Tax Not Paid 24, and Not Yet Eligible 24 
as the independent variables. To avoid multicollinearity, the Poll Tax 
Not Paid 24 was not included in the equation. In a hypothetical county 
where 100 percent of the votes cast for Coolidge in 1924, the predicated 
Hoover vote in 1928 was constant plus bl coefficient. The constant plus 
b2 gave the estimated proportion of 1924 Democratic suporters who 
voted for Hoover, constant plus b3 equaled the proportion of La Follette 
supporters; constant plus b4 gave the estimated proportion on non-voting 
21 
poll tax payers; constant plus b5 equaled the proportion of non-poll tax 
payers who voted for Hoover. To insure summations of urban and rural 
votes equaled the marginals of the table, each county was weighted 
according to the adult population of 1930. The "Percentage of the 
Electorate" are taken from offlcial voting returns and are not estimates. 
Rounding errors can cause the totals to appear incorrect. 
The issues of prohibition, Smith's Catholicism, and Republican 
prosperity are pointed to as keys to understanding Smith's loss in Texas. 
Overlooked may be Hoover's own popularity in the Lone Star state. 
Hoover represented the self-made man, and presented an image Texans 
admired. His overseas adventures as an engineer and businessman made 
him well known to diplomats and foreign leaders. His work directing 
relief in Europe during the First World War, his experience as the the 
leader of the United States Food Administration made him world 
famous. Hoover was also greatly admired for his work on Mississippi 
flood relief in 1927. J. B. Cranflll, editor of the Southern Advance, 
declared for Hoover, citing Hoover's work on flood relief in the South as 
evidence that he would treat the South properly if elected. In the eyes of 
many Southerners, Hoover was not a typical Republican, but a new type 
of leader that the South could trust. 
Despite the increase in turnout throughout the 1920s, only about 
twenty-one percent of the eligible voting population cast ballots in the 
1924 contest while twenty-three percent voted in 1928. Non-voters in 
Texas from 1924, both those paying poll taxes and deciding not to vote in 
1924 and those failing to pay poll taxes entered the active electorate in 
Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great De ression 
(New York, 1967), 20-2, -; . . ran ena r eorge 
Moses (Republican-New Hampshire), June 14, 1928; J. B. Cranfill to 
Tom Connally, January 30, 1928, J. B. Cranfill Papers, (University of 
Texas Archives, Austin). 
1928. At the same time, many active voters from the 1924 contest 
dropped out of the active electorate in 1928. This second case best 
describes the activities of many 1924 John W. Davis supporters in Texas. 
Most Davis supporters sat out the 1928 election as nearly two- 
thirds of the 1924 Democratic voters failed to cast a ballot in 1928 (see 
Table 2). Estimates derived from voting returns show that just under 
one-third of the Davis supporters paid the poll tax in 1928 and then 
failed to vote in the contest. The cross-pressure withdrawal theory of 
voting applies to most of these 1924 Democratic supporters. They 
presumably were people who normally voted Democratic but could not 
bring themselves to switch to the party of Abraham Lincoln and 
Reconstruction. On the other hand, they could not vote for a wet Irish 
Catholic from New York. Just under one-third of the Davis Democrats 
did not even pay the poll tax in 1928. They might have been 
economically disabled farmers or Democrats who anticipated Smith's 
nomination and were unable or refused to pay the two dollar tax. 
Since Smith was unable to fully mobilze many of Davis's 
supporters, he too relied on winning the support of previous non-voters. 
Nearly half of his support came from people who had not voted in the 
1924 presidential election. Around eighteen percent of Smith's support 
came from people who had paid the poll tax in 1924 but did not vote, 
while around twenty-seven percent of Smith's total came from people 
who had not paid the poll tax in 1924. Smith also garnered votes from 
Baum, The Civil War Party System, 112; Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Politic an: e ozca asks o Politics (Garden City, 1963), 
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the supporters of Robert La Follette, the 1924 Progressive candidate for 
president. While over seventy percent of La Follette's supporters cast 
ballots for Smith in 1928, they comprised just under ten percent of 
Smith's vote total (see Table 2). 
In comparing the results in the 1928 contest, one can see that both 
Smith and Hoover relied on previous non-voters. Yet, subtle differences 
in the make-up of their support still remain to be uncovered. Hoover 
received twice as much support as Smith from persons who paid the poll 
tax in 1924 and did not vote. Although most voters who became eligible 
in the 1928 contest chose to sit out the election, those that did vote were 
twice as likely to vote Republican as Democrat. The only area in which 
Smith outpolled his Republican counterpart was in mobilizing persons 
who had not paid the poll tax in 1924. 
In an article published in Buenker's Monthly, Tom Love, the 
leading Anti-Smith Texas Democrat, predicted that the nomination of 
Smith would force the "great host of moral voters. . . , " who Love 
believed carried on in the "Wilsonian Democratic tradition, " out of the 
Democratic party. Leaving their party was not taken lightly. Party 
loyalty was important to rank and file Texas Democrats. Although 
Smith represented an alien force to them, the Democratic party was 
perceived to be the only legitimate party in most parts of Texas. The 
quantitative evidence presented here suggests that switching to the 
Republican party was indeed too much for many loyal Democrats. 
Traditional accounts of the 1928 results, however, interpret Love's 
Thomas B. Love, "Expediency or the Right-Which?" Buenker's 
Mo thty: The Maga 'o of Te as, 1 (geh aey 1928i 183-29 . 
statement about forcing Wilsonian Democrats out of the party to mean 
that former Democrats switched to the Republican party in the 1928 
election. Yet, the voters whom Love envisioned switching to the 
Republican camp in 1928 were insignificant in terms of their raw 
numerical strength. Most 1924 Democrats faced with the choice of 
Smith or Hoover chose to sit out the 1928 contest. 
The Great Depression smashed whatever hope the Republicans 
had of creating a viable two-party system in the Lone Star state, When 
the 1932 presidential election pitted the incumbent Hoover against the 
Democratic challenger, Franklin D, Roosevelt, the Republicans seemed 
doomed to almost certain defeat because of the scope of the national 
disaster and Hoover's inability to solve the crisis to the satisfaction of the 
American people. Nationwide, Roosevelt easily won the 1932 election. 
In Texas, he received more votes than Hoover and Smith's combined 
tallies of 1928. iz 
The breakdown of Roosevelt's Lone Star state coalition was a 
combination of 1928 Democratic supporters, 1928 Hoover voters, and the 
mobilization of previous non-voters, including first time voters and people 
brought into the electorate by the Depression. Roosevelt was able to 
maintain most of the support that Smith received in 1928 (see Table3). 
Estimates show that around ninety-three percent of the 1928 Democrats 
repeated their Democratic ballots in 1932. This core of Democratic 
voters represented over forty percent of Roosevelt's total vote. 
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 
(New York, 1963), 3, 8-12; inson, e rest en ia o 
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Like Hoover in 1928, Roosevelt also relied heavily on the support 
of previous non-voters, as over twenty percent of his total vote came 
from people who had sat out the 1928 contest (see Table3). 
Approximately thirteen percent of Roosevelt's support came from those 
people who had paid the poll tax in 1928, but had not voted in that year, 
while just under ten percent of his total vote came from people who had 
not paid the poll tax in 1928 (see Table3). These new voters might have 
been mobilized by the threat of the Depression. People who were 
unexcited by the election rhetoric of prohibition and the tariff, the 
Depression mobilized these previous non-voters and made them active 
participants in 1932. Nearly forty percent of the previously ineligible 
voters cast ballots for Roosevelt in 1932 (see Table3). This was a 
dramatic shift in the allegiance of recently eligible voters. In 1928 most 
new voters cast ballots for the Republican party, but in 1932 the 
Democratic party under Roosevelt reversed this trend. 
Traditional accounts emphasize the importance of Hoovercrats, 
who allegedly returned to the Democratic party in 1932 as being 
essential to Roosevelt's victory in Texas, but the quantitative evidence 
presented here demonstrates that Hoovercrats were a negligible part of 
the electorate in 1928. Thus they could not be a major factor in the 
1932 election. Although Hoovercrats were not a major element in the 
1928 or 1932 contests, there was a significant number of 1928 Hoover 
supporters who switched to the Democratic party in 1932. About fifty- 
five percent of the 1928 Hoover supporters voted for Roosevelt in the 
1932 election (see Table3). These former Republican supporters 
represented over a fourth of Roosevelt's total vote in the 1932 contest. 
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Table 3. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING 
PATTERNS IN THE 1928 AND 1932 ELECTIONS (in percentage of 
the electorate) (N = 254). 
PREP28 PDEM28 POTH28 PPPT28 PNPT78 PNYE28 PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREPS2 
DEMS2 
OTH82 
PPPT82 
PNPT82 
percentage 
electorate 
10 
10 
18 
18 
47 
61 
10 
68 
100 
Since most of Hoover's support in 1928 came from previous non-voters, 
these new Democratic voters mobilized previously by Hoover were a 
major part of the realignment of the Texas Democratic party. The 
emphasis on Hoovercrats led historians to assume that 1928 was merely 
an aberrant election and that 1932 returned Texas politics to its former 
state. In reality, the 1928 contest was the first stage in a realignment of 
the Texas Democratic party. 
The Texas Democratic party thus underwent a fundamental 
change in composition between 1924 and 1932. By examining 
relationships between voting patterns of 1928 and 1932, many have 
erronously concluded that many Democrats who had been repelled by 
Smith and driven into the Republican column in 1928 returned to their 
party in 1932. But a comparison of voting patterns in the 1924 and 
1932 elections reveals that the bulk of 1924 Democratic voters left the 
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party before 1932. Over sixty-five percent of the 1924 Davis supporters 
did not even bother to pay the poll tax in 1932. The 1928 nomination of 
Smith caused many of them to sit out the election despite having paid 
the poll tax, and in 1932 these former Democratic supporters apparently 
did not even pay the poll tax (see Table 4). 
Table 4. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING 
PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1932 ELECTIONS (in percentage of 
the electorate) (N = 254). 
PREP24 PDEN24 POTH24 PPPT24 PNPT24 PNYE24 PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
DE5482 
OTH82 
PPPTS2 
PNPT82 
percentage 
electorate 
0 
6 
0 
0 
10 
15 
0 
8 
0 
5 
9 
22 
8 
0 
1 
86 
40 18 
8 
2S 
0 
10 
64 
100 
Roosevelt received most of his support from 1924 non-voters, as 
over sixty-five percent of his votes came from people who sat out the 
1924 contest (see Table 4). Almost thirty percent of his vote came from 
1924 poll tax payers who did not vote in that year while almost forty 
percent came from people who did not pay the poll tax in 1924. The 
Democratic party thus went through a process of replacing voters who 
had been alienated by the nomination of Smith in 1928 and in net 
results actually increased the number of Democratic supporters. 
28 
The Depression affected the voting behavior of traditional 
Republicans as well as the new Republican voters drawn in by Hoover in 
1928. Around fifty-five percent of the 1924 Coolidge supporters left the 
Grand Old Party in 1932 and cast ballots for Roosevelt. At the national 
level, Roosevelt appealed to many of the Republican progressives, and 
they bolted their party in 1932. Texas progressive Republicans 
probably followed the lead of their national counterparts. There is also 
the possibility that the "wet" Democratic plank in 1932 appealed to the 
traditionally Republican German-Americans in the Lone Star state. 
The 1936 campaign in most accounts was a referendum on the 
New Deal. The Republicans nominated Alfred Landon from Kansas to 
run against Roosevelt. Landon ran on a platform that favored a 
balanced budget and retrenchment from the New Deal policies of 
Roosevelt. Nationwide, Roosevelt's victory in 1936 helped form the 
foundation of the so-called "fourth party system, " by sweeping away the 
last vestiges of the older voting coalitions and garnering the support of 
immigrants, the industrial Northeast and Midwest, blacks, and 
farmers. i~ 
By comparing the 1928 results with the 1936 results it is possible 
to demonstrate the effects of the short-lived Hoover coalition in Texas on 
subsequent elections. Around eighty percent of Hoover's 1928 supporters 
subsequently voted for FDR in 1936 (see Table 5). This represented 
around thirty-eight percent of Roosevelt's total vote in 1936. 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 184-90. 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 184-190. 
Table 5. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING 
PATTERNS IN THE 1928 AND 1936 ELECTIONS (in percentage of 
the electorate) (N = 254). 
PREP28 PDEM28 PGTH2S PPPT28 PNPT28 PNYE28 PERCENTAGE 
EUSCTGRATE 
PREP86 
DEMSB 
0TH SS 
PPPTSB 
PNPT86 
percentage 
electerere 
8 
0 
0 
0 
10 18 48 
62 
100 
The Democratic party in Texas ironically benefited in the long run 
from the Republican nomination of Hoover. Roosevelt received more 
votes from the 1928 Hoover coalition than any other grouping of 1928 
voters (see Table 5). Voters mobilized by Hoover represented the 
vanguard of the newly-constructed Democratic party in 1936, for 
Democratic voters from the 1924 and 1928 contests had a much smaller 
impact on the composition of the party in 1936. Most of the 1928 Smith 
supporters dropped out of the electorate by the 1936 contest. 
The quantitative evidence presented here suggests that the 
Hoovercrats were an insignificant group in terms of electoral power in 
Texas. While many of the elite members of the Democratic party 
switched parties in 1928, very few rank and file Democrats followed 
them into the Republican party. In fact most Democrats from the 1924 
contest dropped out of the active electorate for at least two presidential 
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elections. The handful of elites who bolted for Hoover publicized the 
election and mobilized previous non-voters who carried the day for 
Hoover. 
The 1928 election fundamentally transformed Texas voting 
patterns. Hoover mobilized new voters while the nomination of Smith 
forced the old Wilsonian Democrats out of the party. The Democrats 
quickly regained control of electoral politics in Texas, but the party was 
transformed, as the new voters mobilized by Hoover, plus new voters 
drawn in by the Depression moved into the Democratic column under the 
leadership of Roosevelt. 
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CHAPTER III 
RUM, RELIGION, AND REALIGNMENT 
The anti-liquor crusade was part of a general social reform 
movement that had a tremendous influence on Texas party politics in the 
years from 1900 to 1920. As early as 1905 political leaders astutely 
noted that Texas leaned towards becoming a prohibition state. Lewis 
Gould's analysis of Texas politics demonstrates that "dry" progressives, 
men like Cullen Thomas, Thomas Love, Morris Sheppard, and Cone 
Johnson, viewed prohibition as part of a larger fight of reform. The 
1928 Democratic nomination of Alfred E. Smith did not mesh with their 
fundamental ideas about reforming Texas and the nation, and it was 
viewed as a "slap in the face" to the predominantly white Protestant 
Texas electorate. i 
Even during the Wilson administration the Southern progressive 
wing of the Democratic party failed to impose their principles upon the 
national Democratic party. Nevertheless, many Texas Democrats 
remained loyal and the Southern Progressive spirit was still strong in 
Texas during the twenties. The prohibition faction in Texas politics still 
existed, but after the passage of national prohibition, it turned its 
energies to "business progressivism, " until the nomination of Smith split 
the Democratic party into two major factions. s 
Dewey W. Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation of 
Progress and Tradition noxvi e, , -, ar oc 
scar . o qui, ay 15, 1905, Oscar Branch Colquitt Papers (Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas Archives, Austin); 
Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists, 28, 284. 
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Tom Love led the dry-wing of the Texas Democratic party, known 
as the Anti-Smith Democrats. The drys were spearheaded at the local 
level by political preachers who linked the issues of prohibition with 
prejudice against Smith's Catholicism. Believing that the nomination of 
Smith would result in a Republican victory in Texas, Love and the Anti- 
Smith Democrats fought to have a "dry" nominated at the Democratic 
National Convention in Houston. Former state senator and 1922 
gubernatorial candidate V. A. Collins urged his fellow Democrats to elect 
Anti-Smith delegates to the national convention, claiming that Smith 
would nullify the Eighteenth Amendment if elected. s 
Political preachers unambiguously made prohibition one of the 
major issues in Texas. J. B, Cranfill, a Baptist minister, whose 
prohibition newspaper, The Advance, designed to elect Hoover, was sure 
a "wet" would lose four to five states of the "Solid South. " In a letter to 
Hoover, Cranfill assured the Republican nominee that Baptist ministers 
in Texas were solidly behind him. Texas Baptists were urged to break 
party lines to defeat a candidate who supported nullification of the 
Eighteenth Amendment. 4 
Gould, Progressive and Prohibitionists, 277-78, 284; Brown, Hood, 
Bonnet, an i e rown ug, , 423; George Brown Ti~n 
"Business rogressivism: ou em Politics in the Twenties, " South 
Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1928. 
J. B. Cranfill to George Doran, August 11, 1928, J. B. Cranfill to Tom 
Connally, Febuary 8, 1928, J. B. Cranfill to Herbert Hoover, May 9, 
1928, J. B. Cranfill Papers (University of Texas Archives, Austin); 
Storey, "Political Parsons: Texas Churchmen and the Election of 
1928, " 70-74; Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1928. 
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Other Protestant ministers did their part in attacking Smith's 
stand on prohibition. The Methodist Episcopal Church South threw the 
weight of its organization behind the anti-Smith movement when it voted 
at its national convention to oppose any "wet" candidate. Its official 
newspaper, The Texas Christian Advocate, stated that Smith's 
acceptance speech clearly made prohibition the issue of the election. 
Texas Methodists were urged to vote for the Republican party as a 
matter of principle, since the Democratic party could not demand loyalty 
over principle. s 
Religious leaders throughout the state attacked Smith through 
sermons, rallies, and private letters. A member of the Southwestern 
Baptist Theological Seminary wrote that the "vitalities of civilization and 
the kingdom of God" were at stake in the presidential race. The 
president of the Methodist affiliated McMurray College, called the New 
York governor a "dirty drunken bum, " and added that the Roman 
Catholic Church was a subversive organization attempting to gain 
political control of America. The minister of Trinity Heights Methodist 
Church in Dallas told his congregation that every Roman Catholic in 
America would vote for Smith, claiming Catholics had nothing in 
common with American ideals and that "they would bring reproach upon 
our liberties. " The American Baptist Association declared Smith's 
religious ties were intolerable because the Roman Catholic Church was a 
dangerous political organization. The Baptist Standard, the official 
newspaper of the Southern Baptist Convention was an instrumental part 
Storey, "Political Parsons, " 72-73. 
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of the anti-Smith campaign conducted by Texas Protestant churches. 
The Standard repeatedly attacked Smith's Catholicism and his pro-liquor 
position. One article listed three sources of Smith's support: organized 
crime (especially liquor tra6ickers), big business which wanted 
immigration laws relaxed so they would have a cheap source of labor, 
and the Catholic Church which hoped to "take charge of the policies" of 
America and thereby dominate the world. s Although such accusations 
against Smith and the Catholic Church were irrational and had no 
foundation whatsoever, they struck a responsive chord among many 
Texas Protestants. 
Anti-Smith rhetoric in the pulpit did not necessarily translate into 
financial support for the Anti-Smith Democrats of Texas. The Anti- 
Smith Democrats sent out over four thousand requests for funds to 
Protestant pastors throughout the Lone Star state, but they received 
contributions from less than twenty-five. ~ This lukewarm support of the 
leading anti-Smith organization foreshadowed the election results in 
Texas based on religious voting patterns. While many Texas Protestants 
opposed Smith, they could not support the alternative — a Republican. 
Smith's religious aAiliation was also questioned by some of the 
state's political leaders. Senator Collins declared that the decay of 
civilization was a result of Catholicism and used the example of Texas's 
Storey, "Political Parsons, " 61, 68, 75-80; L. R. Scarborough to J. B. 
News, May 20, 1928. 
Oscar B Colquitt to Dr. W. J. Hearon, September 8, 1928, Oscar 
Branch Colquitt Papers, (University of Texas Archives, Austin). 
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southern neighbor, the Republic of Mexico, to illustrate this insight. s 
Smith's supporters in Texas were not nearly as active as his 
opponents. Few Texas politicians actively campaigned for him although 
many announced that they would vote for the New York governor. U. S. 
Senator Morris Sheppard, the father of national prohibition, announced 
he would support Smith in his quest for the presidency. Sheppard 
remained true to the Democratic party because he believed Smith could 
not overthrow national prohibition without support in Congress. He also 
stated the first step to good government was to oust the corrupt 
centralized Republican party. Jesse Jones, wealthy banker and publisher 
of the Houston Chronicle, also refused to bolt from the Democratic party. 
Like Sheppard, Jones thought Smith alone could not change prohibition 
laws and claimed that Smith's acceptance speech made it clear that the 
Eighteenth Amendment would be enforced. 
Students of the 1928 election in Texas have attributed Smith's 
defeat to the defection of Protestants from Democratic to Republican 
ranks. They assert confidently that many Protestant Democrats left 
their party to support Hoover. ' But examining patterns of voting 
according to religious affiliation demonstrates that Protestants preferred 
not to vote or even vote for Smith rather than switch to the Republican 
Dallas Morning News, May 5, 1928. 
Morris Sheppard to J. B. Cranfill, August, 23, 1928, J. B. Cranfill 
Papers; Jesse Jones to J. B. Cranfill, August 28, 1928, J. B. Cranfill 
Papers. 
Casdorph, The Republican Party in Texas, 1865-1965 (Austin, 1965), 
136; Albe ar, ross urren s m e Laic ion, current History, 
24 (December 1928), 368. 
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party. Hoover received most of his support from people with no religious 
preference (see Table 6). Nearly sixty percent of his vote came from 
non-churchgoers while only about a quarter of his vote came from the 
two most vocal churches against Smith's canididacy, the Methodists and 
the Baptists. The increase in support from persons with no religious 
preference, therefore, was as important to Hoover as were abstentions 
among Protestants. 
Table 6. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING 
PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION (in percentage of the electorate) (N = 254). 
PNOREL PRAPT POTHR PMETH PCATH PELREG PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PRE P20 
DEM28 
OTH28 
PPPT28 
PNPT28 
perceata8e 
electorate 
12 
26 
59 10 
12 
60 
100 
Baptists abstained from voting Democratic at an extremely high 
rate in 1928. In 1924 around fifty percent of the Baptists in Texas voted 
Democratic, but in 1928 Baptist support for the Democrats was virtually 
nil (see Table 6 and Table 7). Baptists who voted in 1928 preferred 
Hoover to Smith, but only approximately eleven percent of Texas 
Baptists cast ballots for Hoover. It is of some interest to note that most 
Baptists paid the poll tax in 1928, but only a small percentage voted in 
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the contest. Although most Baptists opposed Smith philosophically, they 
could not vote for the despised party of Reconstruction. Therefore, most 
Baptists sat out the 1928 election: around forty-four percent chose not to 
vote, even though they paid the poll tax, while another forty-four percent 
did not even pay the poll tax (see Table 6). 
What happened to the Baptist vote is best explained by the "cross- 
pressure-withdrawal" theory of voting behavior; that is, "if a group is 
tom between conflicting stimuli of loyalty to none particular party and 
support for a cause championed by another, the group is likely to resolve 
the conflict by not voting. "" In a normal lopsidedly Democratic election 
in Texas this would have had no real effect, but the 1928 contest was so 
close that the defection of Baptists from the Democratic party to the 
ranks of non-voters helped turn the election in Hoover's favor. 
Baptist support for Hoover was minimal and it can probably be 
assumed that most Baptists who voted for Hoover had not voted in the 
1924 contest because few Democrats crossed party lines between 1924 
and 1928 (see Table 6 and 3. 2). Baptists favoring Hoover were probably 
motivated by the twin issues of prohibition and Smith's religion. 
The most surprising results were the estimates of the voting 
behavior of Methodists between 1924 and 1928. Methodists were among 
the most organized and vocal of the anti-Smith groups in Texas. Anti- 
Baum, The Civil War Party System, 112; Lipset, Political Man, 
211-26. 
Hoover won by 27, 162 votes and if only thirty percent of the Baptists 
had voted for Smith this would have translated into over 70, 000 
additional votes for the Democratic candidate. 
Storey, "Political Parsons, " 67-70. 
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Table 7. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING 
PATTERNS IN THE 1924 ELECTION AND RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION (in percentage of the electorate) (N= 254). 
PNQREL PBAPT PCTHR PMETH PCATH PBLREG PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP28 
DEM28 
OTH28 
PPPT28 
PNPT28 
percentage 
electorate 
8 
10 
0 
16 
10 
51 
100 
Smith sentiment was high among Methodist ministers, but the 
membership apparently did not take their cues from their ministers. 
Most Methodists, like most Baptists, paid the poll tax in 1924, but they 
were not as supportive of the Democratic party as their Baptist 
counterparts. Methodists split their support between John W. Davis, the 
Democratic candidate, and the Progressive candidate Robert La Follette 
(see Table 7). 
Methodists may have recognized similar progressive attitudes 
between La Follette and Smith because Methodists supported Smith at a 
higher rate than they supported Hoover (see Table 6). Estimates suggest 
that forty percent of Texas Methodists supported Smith while around 
thirty-one percent cast ballots for Hoover. Methodist support for Smith 
represented over a quarter of his total vote. Despite anti-Smith rhetoric 
in the pulpit, Methodist were about three times as likely to vote for 
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Smith as the electorate-at-large (see Table 6). 
Methodists who supported Smith may have followed the political 
wisdom of the father of national prohibition, Morris Sheppard. Senator 
Sheppard, a Methodist, supported Smith because politically Smith was 
more in line with Sheppard's personal philosophy of government. The 
"corruption" of the Republicans outweighed the "wetness" of Smith in 
the mind of Sheppard, and this may have guided the decision of some 
Methodists. Other Methodists may have selected party over principle 
and voted for Smith. 
The largest single group of potential voters was made up of people 
with no formal religious afYiliation. This group represented over half the 
votes cast in elections between 1924 and 1932 (see Tables 3. 1, 3. 2 and 
3. 3). Non-church members are historically a much under-studied group 
both socially and politically. They have been virtually ignored by 
historians attempting to explain the relationship between religion and 
voting behavior. 
The breakdown of partisan preference of the non-church members 
was roughly analogous to the state-at-large totals (see Tables 3. 1, 3, 2, 
and 3. 3). This means that they were a highly predictable group, but the 
unchurched also had a tremendous impact on the election results. 
Their behavior towards the Democratic party was a major factor in the 
Walter Vernon, Robert W. Sledge, Robert C. Monk, and Norman 
Spellmann, The Methodist Excitement in Texas: A History, (Dallas, 
1984), 240. 
A word of caution about the category, "No Religious Preference", 
because of the size of the group it is easy to forget that as a general 
rule this group tended not to vote in 1928 with only twenty percent 
participating in the election. 
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defeat of Smith. In 1924 non-church members represented about fifty- 
nine percent of the Democratic total vote, but in 1928 they represented 
only about forty-five percent of Smith's total. More importantly, the 
number of non-church members casting ballots for the party dropped in 
half between 1924 and 1928 (see Tables 3. 1 and 3. 2). While the 
comeback of the Democratic party appeared inevitable after the stock 
market crash and the Depression, it is interesting to note that non- 
church members were once again a dominating factor in the Democratic 
party in 1932 (see Table 8). 
Table 8. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING 
PATTERNS IN THE 1932 ELECTION AND RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION (in percentage of the electorate) (N = 254). 
PNOREL PBAPI' POTHR PlifETH PCATH PBLREG PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP28 
OEM28 
OTH28 
PPPT28 
PNPT28 
percentage 
electetete 
40 
82 
7 
10 
10 
04 
Explaining the behavior of the non-church members is almost as 
difficult as describing the composition of the group. There is very little 
written about the unchurched, nor are there any guideposts which 
identify who these people were in terms of social class or economic 
status. Most non-church members in Texas probably identified with the 
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dominant white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant constituents of the state, even 
though they did not have any formal religious affiliation. 
Roman Catholicism was the largest religious denominations in 
Texas, yet it exercised very little political power. Most Texas Catholics 
were Mexican-Americans. In 1924 and 1928 around seventy percent of 
the Catholics did not pay the poll tax while around fifteen percent paid 
the poll tax but did not vote. Historians have postulated that outside of 
the Southern states, Smith offset the loss of Protestant voters with large 
numbers of Catholic immigrants who voted for the first time in 1928. 
But in Texas, Smith was unable to counter the loss of Protestant votes 
with Catholic votes. Catholics turned out for Smith at a lower rate than 
the electorate-at-large (see Table 6). 
One explanation for this would be the use of the poll tax in Texas. 
A traditional method for maintaining Democratic hegemony in Texas 
actually worked against the Democrats in 1928. In order to vote, one 
had to pay the poll tax by the first day of Febuary. Since most Catholics 
were Mexican-Americans from the poorer region of South Texas, they 
were usually unable to pay the annual poll tax. Even if they had been 
motivated to pay the tax by the prospect of a Catholic on the ballot for 
the first time, Smith's nomination was in July, well after the deadline for 
poll tax payment, which effectively disfranchised them. " 
Lichtman, Prejudice and the Old Politics, 76. 
J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage 
Restriction and the s is men o e ne- arW SoiitK, 
ew aven, 
The poll tax served as an even greater stumbling block for the 
state's black church members. Black church members were by far the 
most disfranchised religious group in the Lone Star state. According to 
regression estimates the small percentage of black church members who 
voted cast ballots for Smith in the 1928 election (see Table 6). The 
estimates serve as a corrective to the belief by leading Republicans that 
the "church Negroes" cast ballots for Hoover in 1928. State Republican 
leaders charged the Democrats with buying votes, but they believed that 
black church members were immune to this activity and cast Republican 
ballots. ' Actually, black church members were already casting ballots 
for the Democratic party before 1928 (see Table 7). 
Contemporaries viewed Hoover's victory in the Lone Star state as 
an aberration. Senator Sheppard said the results in Texas were not 
permanent. The Republicans won because they skillfully manipulated 
the prohibition issue to their advantage. One long-time Democrat 
claimed Texans were prohibitionists first, party Democrats afterward. A 
counter to the prevailing view of prohibition as the main reason for 
Smith's defeat was presented by Martin Crane, a former state attorney 
general. Crane argued that prohibition was only a smokescreen for 
religious bigotry. On the surface the defeat of Smith in Texas was a 
R. B. Creager, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman 
Brown Collection, (University of Texas Archives, Austin). 
The next chapter will include a more complete discussion of black 
voting behavior and participation during this period and a discussion 
of the impact of race on the 1928 election. 
Dallas Mornin News, November 9, 1928; Martin M. Crane to 
m . oseve t, December, 11, 1928, Martin M. Crane 
Papers, (University of Texas Archives, Austin). 
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great moral victory for the Anti-Smith Democrats and the "drys, " but 
the victory was actually very different from their perceptions. 
Examining the 1932 election demonstrates that 1928 was more 
than just a deviating election for the Democratic party. The voting 
behavior of many religious groups indicates that they did not return to 
their 1924 loyalties (see Table 8). Comparisons of the 1928 and 1932 
elections show that the tendency of Baptists to drop out of the electorate 
continued in 1932. Over two-thirds of the Baptists in Texas did not pay 
the poll tax. in 1932, compared to thirty-five percent not paying the tax 
in 1928 (see Table 6 and 3. 3). In 1924 nearly all Baptists paid the poll 
tax (see Table 7). The nomination of Smith clearly alienated many 
Baptists although some Baptists might have been forced from the active 
electorate by increasing hard times caused by the Depression. 
Nevertheless, the national Democratic party in 1932 continued to 
alienate rural Protestant American by nominating another "wet" New 
York liberal, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The nationwide transformation of 
the Democratic party did not go unnoticed by old-line Texas Democrats. 
Cone Johnson, a staunch supporter of prohibition, commented on the 
nomination of Smith: "I sat by the central aisle while the parade passed, 
following Smith's nomination and the faces I saw in the mile-long 
procession were not American. I wondered where were all the 
Americans. " The national Democratic party image had changed since 
the days of Woodrow Wilson and many Texas Baptists were 
uncomfortable with that change. The "wets" won out again during the 
1932 Democratic convention and the party came out in favor of repeal of 
44 
the Eighteenth amendment. si 
Methodists, however, were firm supporters of the Democratic 
party in 1932: approximately seventy-one percent of Texas Methodists 
voted for Roosevelt (see Table 8). Methodist apparently had a strong 
tradition of voting for the most progressive candidate as evidenced by 
their support for La Follette in 1924, their greater than average support 
for Smith in 1928 (despite the prohibition issue), and in 1932 their 
continued support for Roosevelt. Methodists drawn into the electorate by 
Hoover and the prohibition issue in 1928, continued to vote in 1932, but 
the impact of the Depression forced them into the Democratic column. 
Catholic voting participation doubled between the 1924 election 
and the 1932 election, with most of the increase coming between the 
1928 and 1932 elections. Catholics may have seen opportunities in the 
Democratic party because of the nomination of Smith in 1928, but many 
were unable to act until 1932. Many who may have wanted to vote in 
1928 were effectively disfranchised because of the Texas poll tax law 
which required payment by the first day of Febuary. 
The relationships between religion and voting patterns reflected 
the instability of Texas presidential politics during the 1928 and 1932 
campaigns. Democrats lost much of their traditional base among Baptist 
voters, but gained Methodist support. The nominations of Smith and 
Roosevelt altered the make-up of the Democratic coalition in Texas. 
While Roosevelt's nomination and the Depression did little to bring 
Baptists back into the electorate, Methodist turnout and non-church 
Dallas Morning News, July 4, 1928; Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. 
oseve an e ew Deal, 9. 
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members replaced them in the Democratic party. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RACE AND REALIGNEMT 
No discussion of Southern politics is complete without an 
assessment of the role of race. V. O. Key claimed that Southern politics 
"revolve around the position of the Negro. " By 1910 across the South 
black disfranchisement was almost complete. In Texas despite the 
disfranchisement of blacks through the poll tax, many white Texans 
pushed for further disfranchisement through implementation of the all 
white primary. Some believed the poll tax was subverted by politicians 
paying poll taxes for poor whites, blacks, and Hispanics. Potential black 
and lower class white voting power was perceived as a threat to the 
social structure of the state. Fear of black voting and its impact on 
society was never far below the surface of Texas politics, and it played a 
role in the 1928 election campaign and the development of the New Deal 
realignment in Texas. ' 
Key postulates that Hoover carried Texas in the 1928 election 
because of the impact of race. In counties with a black population 
greater than fifteen percent, Key pointed out that Smith and the 
Democratic party won fifty-nine of seventy-one counties. s But in the one 
hundred eighty-three counties with black populations less than fifteen 
percent, Hoover won one hundred thirty counties. Key speculates that 
Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 5. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the counties with greater a black 
opulation greater than fifteen percent will be referred to as "black 
elt counties. " 
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this was because the specter of race was less of a factor in these counties, 
as the memories of Reconstruction and the myth of black rule were not 
as strong. s 
Key's statements about Texas have been accepted as the standard 
interpretation about the state's politics in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Key's thesis can be refined by carefully examining the 1928 
election in Texas. 
One of the essential problems with Key's argument is the very 
nature of the issue of race in the 1928 election. While Key is correct in 
pointing out that the Democratic party raised the specter of "Negro 
domination" if Hoover were elected, he neglects to point out that the 
Anti-Smith Democrats also participated in "black-baiting" during the 
campaign. The Democrats declared that Hoover canceled orders for the 
segregation of white and black workers in the Bureau of the United 
States Census. Congressman Sam Rayburn conjured up images of a 
return of Reconstruction in a speech at Fort Worth's First Baptist 
Church: 
As long as I am a white man, live among white people and 
respect the white womanhood of the Southland, I will never 
vote for Herbert Hoover, the advocate of racial social 
equality and the man who forced white girls working in his 
department, to share with negro women the lavatories and 
comfort stations. As long as I honor the memory of my 
Confederate father to our Southland and wear his name, I 
will never vote for the election of a party which sent the 
carpet bagger and the scalawag to the prostrate South with 
saber and sword to crush the white civilization of the South 
to the earth. If he is elected President, he will undertake 
the same policy of abolition of segregation of the races to all 
of the departments of our government. 4 
Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 320-22. 
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The AntiNmith Democrats countered the charges against Hoover 
with a vicious assault on Smith. Former Texas governor Oscar B. 
Colquitt led the whispering campaign against the New York governor by 
publicizing a letter which questioned Sinith's commitment to keeping 
Negroes politically in their place. Smith was also accused of supporting 
a miscegenation bill and a bill to give blacks equal rights in the state of 
New York. Issue number three of Colquitt's campaign paper, the 
Constitutional Democrat, had a picture of Ferdenand Morton, a Negro 
Civil Service Commissioner of New York City, dictating a letter to a 
white stenographer. Colquitt received numerous requests for this issue 
because it would vindicate Hoover on the "nigger question. " AntiNmith 
Democrats defended Hoover's actions in the Commerce department by 
saying that having census workers in the same office was at President 
Coolidge's request, who reminded Hoover about a provision in the Civil 
Service Law against ~tion. Anti-Smith Democrats declared that 
Hoover tried to segregate workers, but Federal law stopped him. The 
Republicans and Hoover did nothing to counter these assertions by the 
Anti-Smith Democrats of Texas. Hoover was willing to 1st the 
whispering campaign against Smith continue on the religious issue, and 
it appears he allowed it to continue in the South on the race issue as 
well s 
4 Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown J, 412. 
s Reverend Bruce Roberts to Oscar B. Colquitt, October 20, 1928, Oscar 
Colquitt Papers; B. P. Maddox to O. B. Colquitt, October 13, 1928, 
Colquitt Papers; Judge Hugh A. Locke (Alabama Anti-Smith 
Democrats) to O. B. Colquitt, September 19, 1928, Colquitt Papers 
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Key's assessment of the importance of race in Southern politics 
fails to take into account the impact of racism within the Democratic 
party itself and its impact on support for Smith. Colquitt was so worried 
about "Negro domination" he refused to attend the national meeting of 
the Anti-Smith Democrats if blacks were represented. The race question 
thus split the Texas Democratic party and became as useful a tool 
against Smith as the issues of prohibition and religion. 
Key argues that by identifying the Hoovercrats there is a whole 
new understanding of the Southern Democratic party. 7 Yet, there were 
very few Hoovercrats in Texas as has already demonstrated. Key's 
arguments about race and politics probably explains more about 
mobilization and alienation in Southern politics than about the nature of 
the Southern Democracy. 
It is possible to test Key's hypothesis concerning the 1928 results 
by isolating counties that had black populations greater than fifteen 
percent. In the black belt counties twenty percent turned out to vote 
compared to the statewide turnout of twenty-three percent. In 1924 
black belt counties mirrored turnout throughout the state. As Key has 
shown, Smith carried most of the black belt counties, but his margin of 
victory was only eleven percent of the potential electorate to nine percent 
232-33. 
Headquarters of the Anti-Smith Democrats to Oscar Colquitt, August 
1, 1928, Colquitt Papers. 
Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 318. 
See chapter two for a discussion of the lack of Hoovercrats in the 1928 
election in Texas. 
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for Hoover (see Table 9). 
Table 9. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING 
PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1928 IN THE BLACK BELT (in 
percentage of the electorate) (N= 71). 
PREP24 PDEM24 POTH24 FPFT24 PNPT24 PNYE24 PERCENTAOE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP28 
DEM28 
OTH28 
PPPT28 
PNPT28 
perceatage 
electorate 
16 
40 
48 
88 
The breakdown of Smith's support in the black belt counties was 
almost identical to his support statewide. Just under one-third of the 
1924 Democratic supporters repeated their vote for Smith in 1928 in the 
black belt counties, which was the same as the statewide results (see 
Table 2). Black belt Democratic voters in 1924 were more likely to pay 
the poll tax in 1928 and not vote than the statewide 1924 Democratic 
supporters. Around fifty-six percent of the 1924 John Davis supporters 
paid the poll tax in 1928 and subsequently did not vote, nearly a quarter 
more than the statewide supporters of the Democratic ticket. This 
suggests that black belt Democrats traditionally voted, but when faced 
with prospect of a wet Irish Catholic who was liberal on the race 
question, they chose to sit out the election. In the black belt the 
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pressures of two candidates who were not "safe" on the race question 
resulted in increased not-voting among whites despite having paid the 
poll tax in 1928 (see Tables 2 and 9). 
On the other hand, Hoover ran much weaker in the black belt 
counties, and the make-up of his support was very different. Hoover was 
able to retain the small group of 1924 Calvin Coolidge supporters but 
mobilized most of his support from new voters and those persons who 
had not paid the poll tax in 1924. The statewide results, by way of 
comparison, show Hoover receiving miniscule support from 1924 non-poll 
tax payers. Hoover also received less support in the black belt than in 
the entire from people not yet eligible to vote in 1924 (see Table 9). 
To further test Key's thesis that 1928 bolters came from non-black 
belt counties, the results for the the non-black belt counties were 
examined. Once again Key's arguments appear to be correct on the 
surface: in counties with a black population less than fifteen percent 
Hoover won thirteen percent of the potential vote as compared to Smith's 
eleven percent. But, the breakdown of Smith's support was almost 
identical in non-black belt counties as in black belt counties. This 
suggests that Key's arguments about Southern support for Smith are 
inaccurate. If Key's thesis was accurate, then Smith's support in the 
non-black belt counties should decrease; instead he polled the same 
percentage of the vote in both black belt and non-black belt counties. 
The 1924 Democratic voters also behaved about the same way in 1928 in 
the non-black belt counties as they did throughout the state. Although 
Non-black belt counties in this thesis were those counties with a black 
population of less than fifteen percent, 
in the black belt counties slightly more 1924 Davis supporters did not 
pay the poll tax in 1928 (see Table 10). 
Table 10. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS 
VOTING PATTERNS IN 1924 AND 1928 IN NON-BLACK BELT 
COUNTIES (in percentage of the electorate) (N= 188). 
PREP24 PDEM24 POTH24 PPPT24 PNPI'24 PNYE24 PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP28 
DEM28 
OTH28 
PPPT28 
percentage 
electorate 
14 
8 
0 
0 
88 
42 18 
66 
100 
The breakdown of Hoover's vote in the non-black belt counties was 
similar to the statewide results. The major difference was that non-black 
belt counties had a stronger Republican base in 1924, a voter base that 
moved into Hoover's column in 1928. Hoover's support clearly came 
from the non-black belt counties Key's thesis thus works when explaining 
Hoover's base of support (see Table 10). 
The results presented here demonstrate that Southern voting 
patterns were far more complex than differences between black belt and 
non-black belt counties. While Hoover's vote was directly related to the 
number of blacks in a county, Smith's vote totals were not as directly 
related. The more blacks in a county the lower the turnout for Hoover. 
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Democratic support was Smith's inability to secure a strong cadre of 
repeat Democratic voters, regardless of region. In the black belt, most 
1924 Democratic voters subsequently paid the poll tax in 1928 and did 
not vote. While in the non-black belt counties many 1924 Democrats did 
not even pay the poll tax in 1928. 
The specter of "Negro domination" as outlined in the campaigns of 
the Democrats and the Anti-Smith Democrats clearly affected the 
outcome of the 1928 election. In the black belt, the race question and 
other issues alienated many 1924 Democrats and Hoover was unable to 
mobilize enough new voters to carry the counties. Yet, in the non-black 
belt counties Hoover mobilized enough new voters to offset his losses in 
the black belt. 
In addition to the impact of the presence of blacks on voting 
patterns, there is the separate question of racial and ethnic voting 
patterns in Texas. Although Texas had a predominantly white 
population in 1930, there were pockets of foreign-born Americans, such 
as Germans and Italians, in addition to the Hispanic and black 
populations. 
Contemporaries and historians have assumed that German- 
Americans in Texas cast their ballots for Smith in 1928 because of the 
prohibition issue. Most observers believe that the German population 
traditionally voted Republican and switched to the Democratic party in 
1928. Some Republicans and Anti-Smith Democrats believed the 
Republicans lost anywhere between fifty and seventy-five percent of the 
German vote in 1928. The small Italian farming communities in Texas 
54 
also allegedly voted for Smith, although most leading Republicans of the 
period attributed their attraction to Smith to Catholicism. 
The movement of voters into and out of the various political 
parties and the active electorate demonstrates that contemporary 
observers were only partially correct about the results of the foreign-born 
vote in Texas. The quantitative evidence suggests that in 1924 foreign- 
born voters in Texas split between voting for Robert La Follette, the 
Progressive candidate, Calvin Coolidge, the Republican, and not paying 
the poll tax (see Table 11). 
ln 1928 the foreign vote split between Smith and not paying the 
poll tax. Since there was very little crossover voting between the 
Republicans and the Democrats, most of the 1928 foreign-born votes for 
Smith came from the La Follette camp and the 1924 non-voters (see 
Table 12). An important factor to note is that the foreign-born vote does 
not take into account the counties in Texas known as the German 
counties. The so-called "hill country of Texas" was as much culturally 
German as it was Texan. 
Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 416; Harve Haines, 
Answers ta WepPuHcan ar y ues ionnaire, Norman Brown 
Collection; Leonard Withington, Answers to Republican Party 
Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection; Fred L. Haskett, Publicity 
Manager of the Anti-Smith Democrats of Texas, Answers to 
Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection; R. B. 
Creager, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown 
Collection (University of Texas Archives, Austin). 
Seth Shepard McKay defines the German counties as Austin, Comal, 
De Witt, Fayette, Gillespie, Guadalupe, Kendall, Lee, Medina, and 
Washington in his book, Texas Politics, 1906-1944: With Special 
Referee to ttt Ge an Goalu i Ge, lnR2M 
Table 11, ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS 
VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 ELECTION AND RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC BACKGROUND (in percentage of the electorate) (N =254). 
PNAWHT PBLACK PHISP PFOWHT PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP24 
DEM24 
OTH24 
PPPT24 
PNPT24 
percentage 
electorate 
18 
19 
85 
72 
10 
15 
100 
Table 12. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS 
VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC BACKGROUND (in percentage of the electorate) (N= 254). 
PNAWHT PBLACK PH1SP PFOWHT PERCENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP28 
DEM28 
OTH28 
PPPT28 
PNPT28 
percentage 
electorate 
86 
72 
12 
12 
20 
68 
100 
Another ethnic voting block in Texas was the Hispanic community. 
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Mexican-Americans made up eleven percent of the population in 1930. 
One prominent political scientist in Texas claimed that the Mexican- 
Americans voted in large numbers for the Democratic party in election 
after election, arguing that South Texas bosses paid the poll tax for 
many constituents and then herded them to the polls on election day. 
This may have been true for local elections and even in state primaries, 
but the quantitative evidence suggests that most Mexican-Americans did 
not even pay the poll tax. In the 1924 presidential election an 
insignificant number of Mexican-Americans cast ballots in the contest. 
According to regression estimates nine percent of the Hispanics paid the 
poll tax and subsequently did not vote (see Table 11). However, in 1928 
Smith mobilized part of the Mexican-American vote: nine percent voted 
for him. Another nine percent paid the poll tax, but sat out the contest. 
The remaining eighty-two percent did not pay the poll tax (see Table 12). 
Some Texans had a fear of bossism and encouraged the Anti-Smith 
Democrats to stop the alleged illegal voting in South Texas. R. B. 
Creager declared that most of the Mexican-Americans in the border 
counties "were voted" for Smith. is The quantitative evidence 
demonstrates that relatively few Hispanics paid the poll tax, and few 
"were voted" for Smith in the 1928 election. 
O. Douglas Weeks, "The Texas-Mexican and the Politics of South 
Texas, " American Political Science Review, 24 (August 1930), 
625-27. 
R. W. Merrill, First Baptist Church Kerrville, to Oscar Colquitt, 
Colquitt Papers; and R. B. Creager, Answers to Questionnaire, 
Norman Brown Collection. 
57 
The largest single minority in Texas was the black population. 
Blacks represented fourteen percent of the adult population in 1930. As 
previously noted most blacks had been disfranchised since 1902 with the 
passage of the Terrell Election Law. Disfranchisement continued to be 
an effective tool in Texas as only fourteen percent of the blacks cast 
ballots in the 1924 election although the estimates suggest that another 
twenty-one percent paid the poll tax and did not vote. Of those blacks 
who voted in 1924, most supported the Democratic candidate, Davis (see 
Table 11). Leading Republicans maintained that the black vote in Texas 
was getting smaller and the majority of those who voted cast Democratic, 
not Republican, ballots. They argued that these votes were purchased by 
the Democrats. Some of their assumptions about the black vote are 
substantiated by the quantitative evidence. The black vote did shrink 
between 1924 and 1928, as only seven percent of the adult blacks cast 
ballots in 1928 (see Table 12). Fred Haskett of the Anti-Smith 
Democrats pointed to a group of black Republicans led by "Gooseneck 
Bill" McDonald who switched to the Democratic party in the 1928 
contest. ts 
The breakdown of racial and ethnic voting patterns demonstrates 
the effectiveness of disfranchisement in Texas. The two largest minority 
groups, the Hispanics and the blacks, represented about a fourth of the 
eligible voting population of Texas, but only about ten percent cast 
ballots between 1924 and 1928. The New Deal realignment which 
R. B. Creager, Answers to Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection. 
Fred Haskett, Answers to Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection). 
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included Northern blacks failed to include two large voting blocks in 
Texas. 
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CHAPTER V 
A CLASH OF CULTURES'? RURAL/URBAN VOTING PATTERNS 
FROM 1924 TO 1932 
Some historians view the 1928 presidential election, nationwide, as 
a clash between rural and urban America. The election split the 
American electorate for these historians. On one side were Catholic, 
wet, foreign-born, urban dwelling Americans and on the other were 
Protestant, dry, white, rural Americans. Herbert Hoover's breaking of 
the "Solid South" and Alfred Smith's victories in the cities are cited as 
examples of this duality and proof of its existence. One historian writes 
that "a complex of political, social, and moral attitudes had established 
itself, compounded by nativism, fundamentalism, prohibitionism, and a 
conviction that the American character resided in the farm and the 
hinterland town. " If the 1928 outcome represented a clash of cultures 
and Hoover's victory was the last gasp of rural America, then an analysis 
of rural voting patterns should show a movement of rural Americans into 
the Republican column. 
Political scientists V, O. Key and Samuel Lubell both demonstrate 
that Smith mobilized the industrial centers of the Northeast and Midwest 
in terms of national politics. z If rural America was repulsed by Smith 
This interpretation is most prominently espoused by Samuel Lubell, 
The Future of American Politics, William Leuchtenberg; The Perils of 
o ye y, a «reer; he p iit'cs oi p o ' daVsatec 
Deeraocra party ' T a sistio, - e o 
Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections, " Journal of Politics, 3-18; Lubell, 
The Future of American Politics, 48-52. 
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and drawn to Hoover, then there is no better case study than the South, 
for the South was the most homogeneous rural region in America in 
1928. Even the cities of the South were considered to be merely 
extensions of the surrounding areas. s 
In the 1924 election the rural population of Texas carried the day 
for the Democratic party. The rural farm vote for John Davis was twice 
that of the combined urban and rural non-farm vote in 1924. Rural 
Texans cast over two-thirds of Davis's total vote in the 1924 contest (see 
Table 13). 
Table 13. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS 
VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 ELECTION AND RURAL AND 
URBAN RESIDENCES (in percentage of the electorate) (N= 254). 
PRURP PURE PRURNP PECENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP24 
DE3424 
OTH24 
PPPT24 
PNPT24 13 
SS 
6 
31 
4S 
3 
13 
18 
16 
T. Lynn Smith, "The Emergence of Cities, " in Rupert B. Vance and 
Nicholas J. Demerath, ed. , The Urban South (Chapel Hill, 1954), 
24-37; Gerald Capers, "The Rura ag on ou em Cities, " Mississippi 
Q arra ly, 21 (pall 1666), 253-61; J ss Thompson, Jr. , ~sas y 
IJSre1~outhern Ba tists and the Religious Controversies GMEee20s 
(Macon, 
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The rural vote in Texas outstripped the urban vote nearly two to 
one in terms of turnout in 1924. Despite the size of the rural vote in 
Texas, less than one-third of eligible rural Texans cast ballots (see Table 
13). While rural Texans were more likely to vote in 1924 than urban 
Texans, they were also more likely to pay the poll tax and then not vote. 
The rural population made up sixty percent of the non-voters who had 
paid the poll tax in 1924. Rural Texans, according to the quantitative 
evidence, were split into three groups, just over one-third did not pay the 
poll tax in 1924; just over one-third paid the poll tax and did not vote; 
and just under one-third voted (see Table 13). 
The urban population of Texas had a very different voting 
behavior. Only sixteen percent of urban Texans voted in the 1924 
election, and another fourteen percent were eligible to vote because they 
paid the poll tax (see Table 13). The Democrats doubled the Republican 
party's support among urban dwellers, while Robert La Follette, the 
Progressive candidate, received most of his support from urban areas (see 
Table 13). 
The rural non-farm population's most distinguishing feature was 
its lack of electoral participation. 4 Like the urban population, over 
seventy percent of potential rural non-farm voters did not even pay the 
poll tax in 1924 (see Table 13). Only forty percent of the twenty-eight 
percent who paid the poll tax voted in the 1924 contest and they split 
The census defines rural non-farm as including all persons not living in 
cities or incorporated areas with populations over 2, 500 and not living 
on farms. United States Census Bureau, The Fifteenth Decennial 
Census, Volume III, Population (Washington, : . . vernmen 
~mgMB ce~iiv8. 
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their votes evenly between Calvin Coolidge and Davis. 
On the eve of the 1928 election rural Texans appeared to be the 
most powerful electoral group in terms of their raw numerical strength. 
Rural Texans already had a tradition of voting and a vast number of 
potential voters from among those who had paid the poll tax but did not 
vote in 1924. If the battle between urban and rural Texas was decided 
in the 1928 election, rural Texans would have to carry the day for 
Hoover. The quantitative evidence demonstrates that this perception of 
the election results was not true. Hoover received only a fourth of his 
total vote from rural farm residents and another fourth from rural non- 
farm residents. The rural farm vote in Texas was actually higher for 
Smith: the New York governor outpolled Hoover among rural Texans 
thirteen percent to seven percent (see Table 14). 
Table 14, ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS 
VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RURAL AND 
URBAN RESIDENCES (in percentage of the electorate) (N= 254). 
PRURF PURR PRURNF PECENTAGE 
ELECTORATE 
PREP24 
DEM24 
GTR24 
PPFI'24 
PNPT24 
percentage 
electorate 
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Part of the reason for Hoover's disappointing showing among rural 
farm residents was the farm issue. In the 1920s the rural farm 
population was devastated by declining farm prices and the lack of a 
coherent platform by either party to deal with rural problems. This 
failure resulted in an increased number of Texas farmers sitting out the 
1928 presidential election. The Republicans had promised relief for 
farmers in the 1924 election, and Hoover promised to bring relief in 
1928. But farmers already had a healthy dislike for Hoover before he 
was even nominated. They blamed him for their troubles in the 
immediate post-World War I period because of his activities as the Food 
Administrator during the war. Farmers hoped to block his nomination 
by staging a massive protest at the convention site in Kansas City. 
Turnout for the protest was small, but farmers who attended carried 
signs emblazoned with "Anyone but Hoover! "s Since the Republicans 
offered little substantial relief with the Mc Nary-Haugen Bill, the 
Democrats hoped to seize the initiative and win the farm vote with their 
own relief plan. Smith failed to do this, because he would not commit 
himself to any particular farm relief bill he continually stressed the 
development of a bi-partisan commission which would investigate the 
farm problem. Smith hoped to attract the support of Midwestern 
farmers and stumped the farm belt. He failed to make any major 
speeches on the farm issue in the South, and this apparently cost him 
dearly in the long run. He attacked Hoover's plans for farm relief and 
Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great De ression, 37-39; Roy Peel 
and Thomas onne y, e ampargn: n alysis (New York, 
1974), 24-26, 66-67. 
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the Republican record on the farm issue, but failed to give farmers an 
alternative. Since farmers were faced with no real alternatives in the 
1928 election, most of them chose to sit out the contest. Only twenty- 
one percent of the Texas rural farm population voted in 1928, compared 
to twenty-nine percent in 1924. Around thirty-two percent of the rural 
electorate paid the poll tax in 1928 and did not vote in the election (see 
Table 14). Traditional Democratic loyalities kept only about half of the 
1924 rural farm vote behind Smith in 1928. The rural farm vote 
dropped by only seven percent between 1924 and 1928 statewide, but it 
dropped fifty percent between the same two elections for the Democratic 
party (see Table 14). Texas farmers were trapped by the complex web of 
electoral politics of the 1928 contest. The national Democratic party 
betrayed them by nominating Smith, who was everything they abhorred, 
yet the Republicans had failed to deliver farm relief in 1924 and had 
nominated Hoover. This left most farmers with little choice except to 
drop out of the electorate. 
Contemporary observers were thus correct when they stated that 
the farm issue had very little weight in the 1928 election. State 
Republican leaders believed the farm issue did not cost them any votes, 
declaring that most farmers trusted and voted for Hoover. 7 Apparently 
Peel and Donnelly, The 1928 Campaign, 66-68; Alfred E. Smith, The 
Cam aign Addresses o overnor red E. Smith, Democr'abc 
an i a or resi en, as n, , IKW, 2TV2. 
Leonard Withington, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, 
Norman Brown Collection; Harve Haines, Answers to Republican 
Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection; R. B. Creager, 
Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown 
Collection, (University of Texas Archives, Austin). 
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Texas farmers did not trust Smith or Hoover. Smith's failure to 
campaign in the rural South cost him a possible victory in the Lone Star 
state, since most 1924 rural Democratic voters felt betrayed by the 
national party and sat out the election. 
Since Hoover did not carry the farm vote in Texas, the key to his 
victory in Texas was the urban and rural non-farm vote. These two 
groups were pulled into the active electorate by the 1928 campaign. The 
strong urban element in Hoover's vote totals was the result of three 
possible reasons: the Republican prosperity of the twenties, the strength 
of the Klan in the cities, and the almost rural nature of Southern cities. 
The Klu Klux Klan was very strong in the urban South in the twenties 
and the nomination of a wet Irish Catholic probably brought many of 
them into the electorate. Cities, even Southern cities, benefited from the 
tremendous prosperity of the twenties. This, combined with the 
Democratic party's alienation of many Southerners, resulted in an 
increase in urban support for the Republicans. 
The already weakened rural farm electorate was crushed by the 
Depression. Only thirty-four percent of rural Texans paid the poll tax in 
1932, compared to fifty-two percent in 1928, and sixty-three percent in 
1924. The Depression decreased the number of rural farm residents who 
paid the poll tax and then did not vote. In 1932, only eight percent of 
the rural farm population paid the poll tax and did not cast a ballot in 
the presidential election (see Table 15). Many rural residents could not 
afford to pay the two dollar poll tax and then allow their political voice 
Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 416. 
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to go unheard. The decrease in paying the poll tax and not voting and 
the increase in not paying the poll tax in 1932 is evidence of the changes 
brought by the Depression to Texas politics. 
Table 15. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS 
VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1932 ELECTION AND RURAL AND 
URBAN RESIDENCES (in percentage of the electorate) (N= 254). 
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While the rural farm vote decreased in the state as a whole, it 
increased for the Democratic party. Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to 
return the party's share of the farm vote to its 1924 levels. Just over a 
fourth of the rural residents cast ballots for Roosevelt in 1932. The farm 
vote represented forty-one percent of Roosevelt's total vote in 1932, 
compared to over sixty-five percent of Davis's vote in 1924, indicating 
the farm vote had lost some of its power between 1924 and 1932 (see 
Table 15). 
Since the farm vote only returned to its pre-1928 levels, the 
inclusion of more urban and rural non-farm voters decreased the 
importance of the farm vote in Roosevelt's coalition in Texas. The urban 
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vote represented about a third of Roosevelt's vote total, while the rural 
non-farm vote accounted for about a fourth of his support (see Table 15). 
These new Democratic voters were probably many of the same voters 
mobilized by Hoover in 1928. 
Texas election patterns demonstrate that interpretations hinging 
upon rural/urban conflict in 1928 are too simplistic to explain the 
complex voting behavior of the New Deal realignment. While Texas 
farmers were repulsed by the values represented by Smith, they were 
not drawn to the Republican party because of the lack of a farm relief 
program. The "revolt of the cities" in Texas describes the Hoover vote, 
not the Smith vote. The patterns of alienation and mobilization 
demonstrated in earlier chapters continue when examining the 
rural/urban dimension of Texas presidential politics. Farmers alienated 
by Smith were replaced in the electorate by urban and rural non-farm 
residents, and many of these voters subsequently became important 
components of the New Deal coalition in Texas. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Historians claim the New Deal realignment and especially the 
1928 election had little impact on Southern voting behavior. This thesis 
has attempted to challenge that assumption by using both traditional 
historical methods and quantitative political methods in analyzing Texas 
politics from 1924 to 1932. The nominations of Alfred Smith and 
Herbert Hoover fundamentally changed politics in the Lone Star state. 
The Democratic party underwent a two-stage realignment with the 1928 
election as the first stage. 
The first stage of the realignment was very complex with several 
elements. During the 1928 election, alienation and mobilization of the 
electorate were the key features. Many 1924 Democrats were alienated 
by the nomination of Smith because he was Catholic, "wet", and an 
immigrant's son from New York City. Baptists and rural farm Texans 
were the most likely to turn away from the party in 1928. Democrats 
who left the party in 1928 chose to sit out the election rather than vote 
for Hoover. 
The 1928 election is an excellent example of the "cross-pressure- 
withdrawal" theory of voting behavior. Many rural farm residents and 
Baptists could not vote for Smith, but neither could they vote for Hoover. 
Hoover represented Reconstruction and "Negro domination" to many 
Texans, especially those of the black belt counties. 
Hoover mobilized many first-time voters, previous non-voters, non- 
church members, and urban dwellers. Smith, despite the loss, also 
mobilized new voters. The largest single group of voters who voted for 
Smith was the Methodists. Many Methodists, despite the urgings of 
their ministers, cast their ballots for Smith. The second stage of the 
realignment was the 1932 election. The Depression ruined whatever 
chances there were for a viable Republican party in Texas. Roosevelt 
mobilized vast numbers of 1928 Hoover supporters, as well as most of 
the 1928 Smith voters. Roosevelt attracted first-time voters. He also 
pulled in urban and rural non-farm voters, continuing a process started 
by Hoover in 1928. Thus, the 1928 election and the New Deal 
realigmnent altered the political scene in Texas. 
The impact of these new voting alignments was immediately felt 
in Texas state politics. In 1930 Tom Love, one of the leading Anti-Smith 
Democrats, lost in his bid for the governor's mansion. Most observers 
attribute his loss to Love's support of Hoover in 1928 and the subsequent 
Depression. In light of the quantitative evidence presented here, Love's 
defeat should be re-examined. Love hoped to garner the votes of the 
1928 Hoover supporters, people who he believed were former Democratic 
voters. In reality, the 1928 Hoover supporters were persons with little 
experience in the Texas primary process. In short, the 1928 election 
transformed Texas politics and had an immediate impact on the Lone 
Star state's elections, 
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